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Crowdsourcing enables one to leverage on the intelligence and wisdom of potentially large groups of
individuals toward solving problems. Common problems approached with crowdsourcing are labeling
images, translating or transcribing text, providing opinions or ideas, and similar—all tasks that computers
are not good at or where they may even fail altogether. The introduction of humans into computations
and/or everyday work, however, also poses critical, novel challenges in terms of quality control, as the crowd
is typically composed of people with unknown and very diverse abilities, skills, interests, personal objectives,
and technological resources. This survey studies quality in the context of crowdsourcing along several
dimensions, so as to define and characterize it and to understand the current state of the art. Specifically,
this survey derives a quality model for crowdsourcing tasks, identifies the methods and techniques that can
be used to assess the attributes of the model, and the actions and strategies that help prevent and mitigate
quality problems. An analysis of how these features are supported by the state of the art further identifies
open issues and informs an outlook on hot future research directions.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Crowdsourcing is the outsourcing of a piece of work to a crowd of people via an open call for
contributions (Howe 2006). In crowdsourcing, one group of people (so-called requesters) submit
tasks to a crowdsourcing platform (or service); another group of people (the workers that form the
crowd) contribute to solving the task. The result of solving the task is called an output. Requesters
may evaluate outputs and rewardworkers depending on the respective quality; in situations where
requesters delegate responsibility for quality control to the crowdsourcing platform, outputs may
be checked and rewarded directly and automatically by the crowdsourcing service itself. Rewards
can be money, gifts, reputation badges, or similar (Minder and Bernstein 2012).
Depending on the task to crowdsource and the acceptance criteria by both the requester and
the workers to enter a mutual business relationship, different negotiation models have emerged
so far: The marketplace model (Ipeirotis 2010) targets so-called micro-tasks of limited complexity,
such as tagging a picture or translating a piece of text, for which the requester typically requires
a large number of answers. Prominent examples of crowdsourcing platforms that implement the
marketplace model are Amazon Mechanical Turk, Microworkers, and CrowdFlower. The contest
model (Cavallo and Jain 2012) is particularly suitable to creativeworkswhere the requester fixes the
budget he is willing to spend and workers compete with their solutions for the reward. Examples
are 99designs, InnoCentive, and IdeaScale. The auction model (Satzger et al. 2013) targets works
where the requester fixes the acceptance criteria and workers bid for the task. An example of an
auction platform is Freelancer. But also volunteering, e.g., like in Wikipedia or Crowdcrafting, has
proven its viability, and the spectrum of variations of these models is growing.
The critical aspect is that outputs produced by the crowd must be checked for quality, since
they are produced by workers with unknown or varied skills and motivations (Minder and
Bernstein 2012; Malone et al. 2010). The quality of a crowdsourced task is multifaceted and
depends on the quality of the workers involved in its execution, the quality of the processes
that govern the creation of tasks, the selection of workers, the coordination of sub-tasks like
reviewing intermediary outputs, aggregating individual contributions, and so on. A large body
of empirical studies confirms that existing crowdsourcing platforms are not robust to effectively
check and control the quality of crowdsourced tasks or to defend against attacks such as cheating,
manipulating task outputs, or extracting sensitive information from crowdsourcing systems
(Kritikos et al. 2013). Concerns about the unintended consequences of poor quality control
methods, including financial, intellectual property and privacy risks, malicious attacks, and
project failure are growing (Minder and Bernstein 2012; Malone et al. 2010; Kritikos et al. 2013).
To be fair, it is important to note that platform providersmay not have the necessary information
about tasks to approach these concerns appropriately. For instance, in marketplace platforms task
design is typically fully under the control of the requester, and the platform is not aware if the task
raises intellectual property issues or not. Some quality control and submission filtering activities
may therefore also be carried out by the requester outside the platform to meet expected levels
of quality. Task-specific platforms, such as 99 designs for graphical design tasks, instead, are well
aware of the problem (e.g., intellectual property rights) and help requesters andworkers to manage
them. They can do so, as they focus on few specific task types only, which they know and can
support well.
The increasing importance of crowdsourcing services and the intensification of global com-
petition indicate, however, that building proper solutions to quality problems should now be a
top priority. Ideally, developers of crowdsourcing applications should be offered effective quality
control techniques, methods, and tools that let them systematically build, verify, and change
quality control mechanisms to suit their requirements. Yet, no framework exists that endows
crowdsourcing services with robust and flexible quality control mechanisms, and most research
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on quality control in crowdsourcing has focused on single, specific aspects of quality only,
such as worker reputation or redundancy. In addition, conceived quality control techniques are
typically embedded inside proprietary platforms and not generalizable. Consequently, designing,
building, and maintaining robust and flexible crowdsourcing quality controls remains a deeply
challenging and partly unsolved problem, and requesters and platform operators may not have
the knowledge, skills, or understanding to craft their own quality-aware strategy to safely take
advantage of the opportunities offered by crowdsourcing. For instance, Stol and Fitzgerald (2014)
describe a case study on crowdsourced software development that shows how unpreparedness
to handle quality issues quickly increased project costs. Lasecki et al. (2014) show how state-of-
the-art crowd-powered systems are still not ready to deal with “active attacks,” while Gadiraju
et al. (2015) show that malicious workers can easily cause harm if suitable quality controls are
missing.
This survey aims to shed light on the problem of quality control in crowdsourcing and to help
users of crowdsourcing services and developers of crowdsourcing applications to understand the
various moments where quality comes into play in the crowdsourcing process, how it is manifest
(or not), and how it can be assessed and assured via suitable methods and actions. Concretely, it
provides the following contributions:
—An introduction to quality control in crowdsourcing (Section 2) and a taxonomy to under-
stand and classify the state of the art in quality control techniques for crowdsourcing. The
taxonomy focuses on the three core aspects of quality:
—The qualitymodel that emerges from the state of the art (Section 3), that is, the dimensions
and attributes to describe quality in crowdsourcing services.
—The assessment (the measuring and its methods) of the values of the attributes identified
by the quality model (Section 4). In order to instantiate the quality model, it is necessary
to know and master the respective assessment methods.
—The assurance of quality (Section 5), that is, the set of actions that aim to achieve expected
levels of quality. To prevent low quality, it is paramount to understand how to design for
quality and how to intervene if quality drops below expectations.
—A comprehensive analysis of how state-of-the-art crowdsourcing platforms and services
support quality control in practice (Section 6).
—A discussion of shortcomings and limitations along with the respective challenges and op-
portunities for future research and development (Section 7).
2 QUALITY IN CROWDSOURCING
Quality (and its control) is an active research area in several computing disciplines, including data
quality (Batini et al. 2009; Hunter et al. 2013), quality of software products (Herbsleb et al. 1997;
Jung et al. 2004), software services (Kritikos et al. 2013), and user interfaces (Hartmann et al. 2008).
In many cases, research from these fields is complementary to quality control in crowdsourcing,
and some elements can be adopted to leverage application-specific quality control mechanisms
(e.g., some code quality metrics can be leveraged in programming crowdsourcing tasks). However,
the peculiarities of crowdsourcing require taking into account novel quality issues that are rising,
especially to consider the user involvement in the execution of different tasks (e.g., production of
contents, annotations, and evaluations).
Therefore, it is necessary to consider that in crowdsourcing systems the quality of the output
is influenced by multiple factors (see Figure 1): The requester defines and publishes tasks to
be executed by the crowd via a crowdsourcing platform or a dedicated application. The crowd
produces outputs that are checked for quality and delivered to the requester. The output quality
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Fig. 1. The basic crowdsourcing scenario with its quality aspects.
Fig. 2. The components of the quality control taxonomy and their internal structures.
depends on, among other things, the profiles and abilities of workers, the description of the tasks,
the incentives provided, the processes implemented to detect malicious behaviors or low-quality
data, as well as on the reputation of and collaboration by the requester. The quality of the output
can therefore be expressed by means of quality dimensions that model objective and subjective
aspects of data and product quality, while the actual quality of the outputs is influenced by aspects
related to people (the workers, requesters, and other possible actors), software (the crowdsourcing
platform or application and the design of tasks), and process quality (the organization of work and
the implemented quality measures).
Adapting the expectation-centric definition of quality (e.g., Lewis and Booms (1983)) to crowd-
sourcing, we define the quality of a crowdsourced task as the extent to which the output meets
and/or exceeds the requester’s expectations.
2.1 Taxonomy
Considering the current fragmented literature and lack of an all-encompassing view of quality
control in crowdsourcing, we developed the taxonomy depicted in Figure 2 to understand and
analyze how quality is dealt with in crowdsourcing. The proposed taxonomy features a holistic
view on the problem of quality control in crowdsourcing and aims to highlight the key aspects and
options one has to face when developing quality control mechanisms. The taxonomy is based on
our own experience (Allahbakhsh et al. 2013; Cappiello et al. 2011; Kritikos et al. 2013; Batini et al.
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2009) as well as on an extensive literature review of related areas, discussions with colleagues,
experimentation with systems and prototypes, which allowed us to identify common building
blocks for the different variations in quality control mechanisms. Accordingly, we propose a
taxonomy with three categories that may, in turn, be split into sub-categories:
—A quality model for crowdsourcing that captures which quality dimensions and attributes
have been identified so far in the literature.
—Dimensions represent the components that constitute a crowdsourcing task, such as the
input and output data of the task or the people involved in the task. Dimensions are
described by attributes and are not directly measurable.
—Attributes characterize properties (qualities) of the task, such as the accuracy of data or
the expertise of workers. Attributes are concrete if they are measurable; they are abstract
if they are not directly measurable and values are derived from concrete attributes (e.g.,
aggregations).
—An analysis of the quality assessment methods that have been used so far to assess quality
attributes in the context of crowdsourcing.
—Techniques distinguish who performs the assessment from a high level of abstraction. For
instance, techniques that involve single individuals (e.g., rating) differ from techniques
that involve groups of people (e.g., voting).
—Assessment methods allow one to measure quality attributes. For example, accuracy may
be measured comparing outputs with a ground truth, while worker expertise may be
measured through questionnaires. Methods are like functions that are executed automat-
ically, manually, or both and produce a value as output.
—A study of the quality assurance actions that allow one to improve quality by acting on the
quality attributes identified in the quality model.
—Strategies represent the top-level decisions to be taken when aiming at improving quality,
that is, what to act upon and in which direction. For instance, selecting good workers and
training workers are two different strategies that aim to improve the quality of the people
involved in a task.
—Actions are the basic operations one can perform to prevent or fix quality problems, such
as checking credentials or showing a training video. Each action implements a specific
strategy.
In the following sections, we detail each of these components and explain them with help from
the respective literature.
2.2 Literature Selection
In order to identify the references to consider in this survey, we selected a set of conferences and
journals that, to the best of our knowledge, publish research on crowdsourcing and related top-
ics. The conferences considered were AAAI, BPM, CAiSE, CHI, CI, CIKM, CSCW, ECML, ECSCW,
HCOMP, ICML, ICSE, ICWE, iUI, KDD, NIPS, SIGIR, UBICOMP, UIST, VLDB, WSDM, and WWW.
The journals considered were ACM CSUR, ACM TIIS, ACM TOCHI, ACM TOIS, ACM TOIT, ACM
TOSEM, ACMTWEB, Communications of the ACM, CSCW, Information Systems, IEEE Computer,
IEEE Internet Computing, IEEE TKDE, IEEE TSC, IEEE TSE, VLDB, andWWW. In order to keep the
selection of references manageable and up to date, we queried for contributions from 2009 onward
using the following keywords in either the title, abstract, or keywords: Crowd, Crowdsourcing,
Human Computation, Collective Intelligence, Social Computing, Collaborative Computing, Col-
laborative Systems, Wikinomics, Mass Collaboration, Micro-tasking, Crowd Labour. Articles were
retrieved through the advanced search feature of the ACM Digital Library and SCOPUS. Papers
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Fig. 3. The quality model for crowdsourcing tasks emerged from literature with dimensions (boxes with
shadow) and attributes (boxes without shadow).
published in HCOMP and Collective Intelligence were retrieved manually, as at the time of query-
ing they were not properly indexed by any digital library. The selection specifically looked for con-
ference and journal papers, and neglected demo papers, posters, and workshop papers. The search
identified 1,013 papers. A further manual check filtered out 257 papers that we finally considered
relevant for this survey. Additional papers considered stem from prior knowledge by the authors.
3 CROWDSOURCING QUALITY MODEL
Figure 3 illustrates the quality model identified as a result of this survey. We identify the following
dimensions to group the quality attributes in crowdsourcing systems:
—Data: This refers to the data required to perform a task or produced as a result of performing
a task by a worker (i.e., task input and output data). For instance, input data can be images to
label or a text to translate, and the corresponding output data can be the labels of the images
and the translated text. Quality control in crowdsourcing all revolves around achieving
high-quality output data, which is the core challenge for mass adoption of crowd work
(Kittur et al. 2013).
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—Task: The type of work proposed, theway it is described, and how it is implemented strongly
affects the attractiveness of a task and the quality of the outputs that can be achieved. We
distinguish the following sub-dimensions:
—Description: This is the description of the work the requester asks the crowd to perform;
it includes the instructions of how to perform the task and possible context information.
The clarity and details of the description influence the way workers perform the task and
hence the quality of its output (Chandler et al. 2013).
—User interface: This is the software user interface workers use to perform the task. In most
tasks, this interface is a simple HTML form throughwhichworkers submit their contribu-
tions. But it can also come in the form of a stand-alone application with input techniques
not supported by standardHTML forms (e.g., selecting patterns in amodel). The quality of
the user interface determines how easily workers can perform tasks (Marcus et al. 2012).
— Incentives: Crowdsourcing generally implies paid, online work. The incentives, that is,
the stimuli the requester offers to attract workers to tasks, plays therefore a crucial role
in crowdsourcing. Incentives may come in two different forms: extrinsic incentives (e.g.,
rewards) and intrinsic incentives (e.g., worker status). Several studies have identified di-
rect relations between incentives and output quality and/or task execution speed (Singer
and Mittal 2013).
—Terms and conditions: These are the general rules and arrangements that govern the work
relationship between the requester and the workers. Aspects like the privacy of workers,
the protection of intellectual property (IP), compliance with laws, ethical standards, and
similar are typically specified here. Terms and conditions affect worker interest and legal
aspects (Wolfson and Lease 2011).
—Performance: Performance expresses the amount of useful work completed in the context
of a crowdsourced task compared to the time and resources needed for its processing.
Crowdsourcing can be an intricate endeavor, with large volumes of input data to be pro-
cessed and hundreds or thousands of workers involved, that can easily grow complex.
Controlling the consumption of resources is of utmost importance to guarantee the sus-
tainability of crowdsourcing initiatives.
—People: These are the actors involved in the task, including requesters, workers, and the
crowd. Good work requires qualified, prepared and trusted people. In some tasks, workers
may also be required to collaborate with other workers or requesters. We distinguish three
sub-dimensions regarding the people involved in crowdsourcing:
—Requester: The first sub-dimension acknowledges the role of the requester, who is not
only the one that crowdsources work, but also the one that may evaluate outputs and
interact with workers. Fairness and communication are examples of attributes of a good
requester (Irani and Silberman 2013; Allahbakhsh et al. 2012).
—Worker: The other natural sub-dimension focuses on the workers. Substantial work has
been done on discriminating good from bad workers. We group the identified attributes
into profile, credentials, and experiences, in function of what the attributes describe. Pro-
file characterizes an individual’s identity (age, gender, location) and describes the indi-
vidual’s distinctive character, typically expressed through motivation and so-called per-
sonality traits, that is, relatively stable, enduring properties of people that can influence
behavior (John et al. 2008). Credentials are documented qualifications that people bring
into a system from the outside. Experiences express knowledge acquired or social relations
established by using a system; they are usually based on system-specificmetrics and rules.
—Group: Finally, people can be studied also in groups, for example, the crowd as a whole
or smaller teams of collaborating workers. Good groups, for instance, are formed by
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non-colluding workers (KhudaBukhsh et al. 2014) or by workers that are able to perform
also very diverse tasks with good quality.
We describe the attributes that characterize each dimension next. Appendix A summarizes the
referenced literature.
3.1 DataQuality
A large body of work focused on characterizing and handling data quality in the context of crowd-
sourcing. The most important attribute studied is the accuracy of output data (Hansen et al. 2013;
Kazai et al. 2011a; Yin et al. 2014). Several synonyms are used to refer to accuracy, such as “good-
ness” (Cao et al. 2014), “correctness” (Yin et al. 2014), or just generically “quality” (Eickhoff et al.
2012; Kulkarni et al. 2012a; Kern et al. 2010). Data consistency is commonly interpreted as the sim-
ilarity between outputs produced by different workers in response to a same input. It has been
studied, for instance, in the context of peer consistency evaluation (Huang and Fu 2013b; Eickhoff
et al. 2012). The timeliness of data is the property of outputs to be available in useful time for further
processing (Kittur et al. 2013). Timeliness is especially important in near-real-time crowdsourcing
scenarios (Lasecki et al. 2013a and 2013b) and has also been studied under the name of “reaction
time” (Yin et al. 2014).
It is important to note that next to these quality attributes that characterize the quality of a
dataset in general terms, many crowdsourcing scenarios ask for the use of ad-hoc attributes that
are able to capture task-specific properties. For instance, Yu et al. (2014) study the accuracy,
coverage, and conciseness of textual summaries; the latter two attributes are specific to the
problem of summarizing texts. Nguyen et al. (2014) distinguish between 13 different features to
assess narrative similarity.
3.2 Task DescriptionQuality
Regarding the quality of task descriptions, its clarity is of utmost importance (Hossfeld et al. 2014).
Tokarchuk et al. (2012) state that clarity positively correlates with performance, a result that is
empirically confirmed by Georgescu et al. (2012), while Kulkarni et al. (2012b) specifically study the
problem of incomplete descriptions. Needless to say, if a worker does not immediately understand
a task, he will not be willing to work on it. Several authors have studied the complexity of tasks
(or “granularity” (Hu et al. 2012)), identified correlations with worker motivation (Rogstadius et al.
2011), and matched workers with tasks based on complexity scores (Difallah et al. 2013).
3.3 User InterfaceQuality
A user-friendly, understandable interface can attract more workers and increase the quality of
outputs (Allahbakhsh et al. 2013). In this respect, especially usability has been studied, for example,
for workers from low-income countries (Khanna et al. 2010), in photographing tasks (Noronha
et al. 2011), or in task design (Retelny et al. 2014). Alagarai Sampath et al. (2014) specifically focus
on visual saliency and working memory requirements as sub-properties of usability. Willett et al.
(2012) show that the design of the task interface has an impact on the learnability of a task. A good
task interface is further characterized by a high robustness against cheaters, that is, it is able to
produce high-quality outputs even in the presence of cheaters (Eickhoff et al. 2012). Hung et al.
(2013a) talk about “sensitivity to spammers.”
3.4 Incentives
Incentives affect the attractiveness of a task. As Hossfeld et al. (2014) point out, there are several
possible incentives targeting either the extrinsic (reward-driven) or intrinsic (interest-driven)
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motivation of workers. According to the authors, increasing extrinsic motivation leads to faster
task completion, while increasing intrinsic motivation leads to higher quality. Many researchers
have specifically studied the role of monetary rewarding in crowdsourcing, for example, on speed
(Heer and Bostock 2010) or execution efficiency (Singer and Mittal 2013), while Eickhoff et al.
(2012) compared fun and social prestige with monetary rewards as incentives.
3.5 Terms and Conditions
At a more abstract level, privacy has been identified as the key property of tasks that deal with
personal data, for example, using images that show people (Lasecki et al. 2013) or ask workers to
share their position (Boutsis and Kalogeraki 2016). But also information security and IP protection,
that is, the protection of data and IP, are emerging quality attributes that affect a requester’s
willingness to crowdsource (Vukovic and Bartolini 2010). A requester may, for example, share
source code or design documents, which are assets that contain IP; quality control mechanisms are
needed, for example, to limit the access of workers to information, invite vetted workers only, or
sign nondisclosure agreements. As Amor et al. (2016) point out in their approach to crowdsourced
team competitions, the problem is not limited to requesters only and may also affect workers.
More generically, compliance means conformance with laws and regulations (Wolfson and Lease
2011), but also with commonly accepted user policies (Wang et al. 2012) (e.g., no malicious
crowdsourcing campaigns) or expected ethical behaviors by the requester (Irani and Silberman
2013). If a task is perceived as non-compliant by workers, it is unlikely they will perform it.
3.6 Task Performance
The two most important attributes that have been studied to capture the execution performance
of a task are cost efficiency and time efficiency. The expected cost of a task is easily determined
by multiplying the reward by the number of task instances worked on Ambati et al. (2012)
and Livshits and Mytkowicz (2014). However, since crowdsourcing a task is a generally non-
deterministic process, cost efficiency, that is, the cost per completed task instance or the cost per
correct output, has been studied more intensively (Ipeirotis and Gabrilovich 2014; Rokicki et al.
2014). The time efficiency can be defined as the number of tasks completed in a given temporal
interval (Eickhoff et al. 2012); Lin et al. (2014) use the synonym “throughput” and Hung et al.
(2013b) talk about “computation time” for a given set of tasks. Kucherbaev et al. (2016a), for
instance, aim to improve the time efficiency by re-launching tasks at runtime. Cheng et al. (2015a)
compute task effort based on error rates and task completion times.
3.7 Requester Reputation
Irani and Silberman (2013) propose Turkopticon, a browser extension for Firefox and Chrome that
augments workers’ view of their task list in Amazon Mechanical Turk with information other
workers have provided about requesters. Turkopticon supports assessing requesters by means of
four attributes: Communicativity captures how responsive a requester is to communications or
concerns raised by a worker. Generosity tells how well a requester pays for the amount of time
necessary to complete a task. Fairness (also studied by Allahbakhsh et al. (2012)) tells how fair
a requester is in approving or rejecting work submitted by workers. Promptness captures how
promptly a requester approves and pays work that has been successfully submitted.
3.8 Worker Profile
Kazai et al. (2011b) study different worker profile attributes and personality traits in labeling
tasks. Age, for instance, correlates with output accuracy, while gender does not seem to have any
influence on quality. Location does impact quality (Kazai et al. 2011b; Eickhoff et al. 2012; Kazai
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et al. 2012). To assess the personality of workers, Kazai et al. (2011b) use the so-called Big Five
inventory and study five personality traits (definitions by John et al. (2008) and correlations from
Kazai et al. (2011b)): Openness “describes the breadth, depth, originality, and complexity of an
individual’s mental and experiential life”; it correlates with output accuracy. Conscientiousness
“describes socially prescribed impulse control that facilitates task- and goal-directed behavior,
such as thinking before acting”; it positively correlates with output accuracy. Extraversion “implies
an energetic approach toward the social and material world and includes personality traits such as
sociability, activity, assertiveness, and positive emotionality”; it negatively correlates with output
accuracy. Agreeableness “contrasts a prosocial and communal orientation toward others with
antagonism and includes traits such as altruism, tender-mindedness, trust, and modesty”; it cor-
relates with output accuracy. Neuroticism “contrasts emotional stability and even-temperedness
with negative emotionality, such as feeling anxious, nervous, sad, and tense”; it negatively
correlates with output accuracy. According to Kazai et al. (2012), personality characteristics are
useful to distinguish between good and better workers (less between good and bad). Kobayashi
et al. (2015) introduce a taxonomy of worker motivations, so that appropriate incentives could be
applied to persuade workers to contribute.
3.9 Worker Credentials
Credentials are all those qualifications or personal qualities that describe a worker’s background;
they can be self-declared (e.g., programming language skills) or issued by official bodies (e.g., a MSc
degree is issued by a university). Skills are abilities that tell if a worker is able to perform a given
task. Mavridis et al. (2016) propose a taxonomy of skills; Difallah et al. (2013) use skills to match
workers and tasks; Schall et al. (2014) identify skills automatically. Certificates are documents that
attest skills, such as academic certificates or language certificates (Allahbakhsh et al. 2013).
3.10 Worker Experience
Badges are platform-provided certificates of performance, for example, performing a certain num-
ber of actions or tasks of a given type (Anderson et al. 2013). Badges can be used to select workers,
but also to motivate them: badges are seen as “virtual trophies” (Scekic et al. 2013a). The reliability
of a worker (often also called “accuracy” of the worker) is commonly interpreted as the aggregated
accuracy of the outputs produced by the worker (Kazai et al. 2011a), or the worker’s error rate in
answering questions (Dalvi et al. 2013; Demartini et al. 2013), or the acceptance rate of outputs
delivered by workers (e.g., Mechanical Turk). Sakurai et al. (2013) use the synonym “correctness”
of a worker as the probability of the worker being correct in labeling tasks. Raykar and Yu (2011)
assign scores to workers based on how reliable (not random) their answers are. The reputation of a
workermay take into account additional parameters, such as theworker’s timeliness, the quality of
the evaluators that assessed the worker, relations with other workers or requesters, the trust they
express toward the worker, and similar (Allahbakhsh et al. 2013). That is, reputation also captures
other communitymembers’ feedback about aworker’s activity in the system (DeAlfaro et al. 2011).
3.11 GroupQuality
The quality of groups of people, that is, teams or the crowd as a whole, has been studied mostly in
terms of three different aspects. Availability, that is, the presence in a platform of enough workers
or experts with the necessary skills for a given task, has been identified as an issue (Li et al. 2014).
Low availability usually leads to low quality of outputs (Ambati et al. 2012) or slow task execution
(Li et al. 2014). Next, diversity is the property of a group to represent different types of people, skills,
opinions, and similar. Diversity is particularly important if representative samples of people are
searched for, for example, in tasks that ask for opinions like the ox weight estimation experiment
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Fig. 4. The quality assessment methods (on the right) emerged from literature; the boxes with shadow rep-
resent generic techniques.
by Surowiecki (2005) or polls (Livshits and Mytkowicz 2014). Willett et al. (2012) specifically study
how to increase the diversity of worker outputs. Finally, non-collusiveness means that a group of
agents does not share information or make joint decisions contrary to explicit or implicit social
rules, which would result in an unfair advantage over non-colluding agents or other interested
parties (KhudaBukhsh et al. 2014).
4 QUALITY ASSESSMENT
Assigning concrete values to some of the attributes identified above can be a straightforward
exercise, for example, verifying if a worker has the necessary skills, certificates or badges for a task
can easily be done manually or automatically (Khazankin et al. 2012), or a task duration can easily
be read from the log of the crowdsourcing system. Assessing some other attributes may instead
require the use of methods based on both automated metrics as well as manual interventions
by workers, the requester, and/or external experts. In the following, we focus on these more
complex methods, and organize the discussion of the identified assessment methods into three
major groups (the techniques) in function of the actor in the assessment task, as illustrated in
Figure 4:
— Individual: Given the human-oriented nature of crowdsourcing, it is natural to think about
involving humans also into assessment tasks and not only into work tasks. Some assessment
methods require the involvement of individuals (workers, experts, or the requester), such
as rating the accuracy of a given output or writing a review.
—Group: Some other assessment methods require the joint action of a group of people (typ-
ically workers) for the formation of an assessment. For instance, voting requires multi-
ple participants to derive a ranking from which to select the best, or peer review requires
multiple peers to judge the work of a colleague.
—Computation-based: Some other assessment methods, instead, can be performedwithout the
involvement of humans, that is, automatically by a machine. Comparing a set of outputs
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with a given ground truth can, for example, be carried out automatically if suitable com-
parison operators are available.
We describe the respective methods next, following the order proposed in Figure 4. We summa-
rize the discussion tabularly in Appendix A.
4.1 Individual Assessments
4.1.1 Rating. Rating means assigning a value to an item chosen from a scale to express the
perceived quality of the item. The scale defines the possible values to choose from, for example,
unary scales allow one to express if an item is liked or not (used, for instance, in Instagram),
binary scales distinguish between two values (good/bad, true/false, thumbs-up/thumbs-down, or
similar), ordinal scales distinguish between discrete sets of positive and negative values (typically
5, 7, or more), and continuous scales may allow an arbitrary number of values inside an interval
([0..1], [1..100], or similar). Rating is extensively used in crowdsourcing for quality assessment
(Dalvi et al. 2013; Yu et al. 2014), text similarity and understandability (Nguyen et al. 2014), worker
confidence (Sakurai et al. 2013), task quality (in CrowdFlower workers rate tasks after completion),
and requester reputation (Irani and Silberman 2013). Hata et al. (2017) have demonstrated that it is
possible to predict workers’ long-term quality using just a glimpse of their quality on the first five
tasks as rated by the requester. Instead, to counteract reputation inflation (too generous ratings,
even if the rater would not want to work with the rated worker/requester again), Gaikwad et al.
(2016) conceived a rating system that rebounds the consequences of feedback back onto the raters,
for example, by giving positively rated workers precedence in future tasks by the same requester.
4.1.2 Qualification Test. A qualification test is a questionnaire that a worker may be required to
fill out to obtain access to tasks that require prior knowledge or skills, for example, language skills
or acquaintance with a programming or modeling tool. Thanks to the a priori knowledge of the
correct answers of the test, qualification tests can be evaluated automatically, granting the worker
access to the task if a minimum threshold of correct answers is reached. Qualification tests are
widespread in crowdsourcing andmany crowdsourcing platforms provide support for qualification
tests. Heer and Bostock (2010) studied the effectiveness of qualification tests to assess workers in
graphical perception experiments; their findings show that qualification tests are indeed able to
discriminate unprepared workers, thereby increasing output quality.
4.1.3 Self-Assessment. Self-assessment asks workers to assess the quality of their own work
after producing an output for a task. The practice stems from self-assessment in learning (Boud
2013), where the aim is to help students reflect, learn, and connect their work better with learning
goals. Dow et al. (2012) studied the effectiveness of self-assessment in the context of crowdsourced
product reviews and found that tasks with self-assessment produced better overall quality than
tasks without. In addition, they found that self-assessment helped workers improve the quality of
their work over time, in line with the expected learning effect. Self-assessment has also been used
to allow workers to state the confidence they have in their own work (Sakurai et al. 2013), even
suggesting workers skip the task if they are not confident (Shah and Zhou 2015). Shah and Zhou
(2016) show noisy output examples to workers right before task submission so they can resolve
possible “silly” mistakes.
4.1.4 Personality Tests. These are tests, typically questionnaires shown to workers, that allow
one to assess personality traits, that is, the actions, attitudes, and behaviors individuals possess.
For instance, Kazai et al. (2011b, 2012) used the so-called Big Five inventory (John and Srivastava
1999) to assess the personality traits openness, conscientiousness, agreeableness, extraversion,
and neuroticism; the authors further identified a positive relation between the former three
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and output accuracy and a negative relation between the latter two and output accuracy.
Turkopticon proposed by Irani and Silberman (2013), instead, allows workers to explicitly rate
the communicativity, generosity, fairness, and promptness of requesters.
4.1.5 Referrals. Referrals express that someone has referred someone else for consideration.
They are well known in the domain of recruitment as a way to gather and confirm expertise. Sales-
Force has indicated in their official blog that their main strategy for recruitment is based on refer-
rals (https://www.salesforce.com/blog/2015/01/behind-scenes-salesforce-our-1-recruiting-secret.
html). LinkedIn and ResearchGate allow tagging skills to professionals. While referrals may not
be a common instrument to identify workers, they may well be used to find experts. Facebook
and Twitter enable recruiting workers by exploiting social connections (Bozzon et al. 2012).
4.1.6 Expert Review. An expert review is an assessment provided by a person that is considered
a domain expert by the requester. This expert is commonly not a member of the crowd (whose
work the expert assesses) and is typically directly assigned by the requester to assessment tasks.
Dow et al. (2012) describe a system that supports expert reviews providing workers with feedback
on the quality of their work and show that expert reviews help increase quality. Expert reviews
are, however, costly; accordingly, Hung et al. (2015) devised a method that optimizes the effort of
experts through reviews of only partial worker output sets while keeping quality high.
4.1.7 Usability Check. Checking the usability of a task design helps identify issues that may
prevent workers from producing high-quality outputs. Specifically, usability guidelines (Nielsen
et al. 2002) can be used by the requester to check if a task design follows known best practices or
not. In the specific context of crowdsourcing, Willett et al. (2012) have studied the usability of task
UIs (understandability and learnability) for data analysis and identified seven guidelines for data
analysis tasks: use feature-oriented prompts, provide good examples, include reference gathering
subtasks, include chart reading subtasks, include annotation subtasks, use pre-annotated charts,
and elicit explanations iteratively.
4.2 Group Assessments
4.2.1 Voting. Voting means expressing preference for one or more candidates (e.g., outputs) out
of a group of candidates; aggregating the votes by multiple voters enables the derivation of a list of
candidates ranked by preference. Voting is very common in crowdsourcing and used tomake group
decisions, for example, two out of three majority decisions. Kulkarni et al. (2012a), for instance,
provide built-in support for voting in their collaborative crowdsourcing platform Turkomatic to
validate the quality of task outputs. Little et al. (2010a) instead equip their human programming
framework Turkit with a dedicated vote programming construct. Caragiannis et al. (2014) study
different voting techniques for crowdsourcing, while Sun and Dance (2012) also point out some
pitfalls of voting that should be taken into account when using the technique.
4.2.2 Group Consensus. Group consensus is similar to voting, yet, the consensus refers to
ratings assigned to an item and less to a mere expression of preference. The purpose is therefore
not ranking multiple items (outputs) but identifying the most representative rating for one item.
The method is frequently used to produce consensus labels from crowd data. Sheshadri and Lease
(2013) compare different techniques to assess offline consensus and study, given multiple noisy
labels (or ratings) per item, how to infer the best consensus label. Zhang et al. (2015) specifically
address the problem of imbalanced labeling, that is, labeling scenarios where there are many
more positive than negative cases (or vice versa). Eickhoff et al. (2012) use disagreement with the
majority consensus to identify workers considered cheaters (if they disagree more than 67% of
the times with the majority) and to derive a measure of robustness of a task. However, consensus
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must not always be good: Kairam and Heer (2016), for instance, show that there is also value in
divergent outputs in crowdsourcing.
4.2.3 Output Agreement. An output agreement is reached if two or more workers, given
the same input and performing the same task, produce a same or similar result as output.
Waggoner and Chen (2014), for instance, study the use of output agreement to assess worker
reliability and show that the technique is particularly useful to elicit common knowledge (since
the workers know that they are assessed based on the similarity of their outputs with those by
other workers). Huang and Fu (2013b) use output agreement (they use the term peer consistency)
to assess and motivate workers. Jagabathula et al. (2014) instead assess workers based on output
disagreement.
4.2.4 Peer Review. Peer review is similar to expert reviews, with the key difference that it
involves multiple peers in the assessment, in order to limit the bias of individual peers and to
elicit an as correct as possible assessment. It is typically used in those situations where experts
would not be able to assess alone all outputs or items, such as in the paper selection of scientific
conferences, and represents a form of community-based self-assessment. Crowdsourcing shares
similar characteristics. Hansen et al. (2013), for example, use peer review in the context of the
FamilySearch Indexing project and show that peer review is more efficient than using an arbitrator
to resolve disagreements among volunteers. Zhu et al. (2014) study different peer reviewing
approaches and show that the practice, next to representing an effective assessment instrument,
may also lead to performance increases of the reviewers (the workers themselves). Peer review
among workers has also been successfully used as a reputation assessment technique, producing
better results than conventional techniques (Whiting et al. 2017).
4.2.5 Feedback Aggregation. More sophisticated aggregation algorithms can be used to
integrate large amounts of feedbacks provided by either workers or requesters, in order to
obtain representative, concise assessment of quality attributes. Dalvi et al. (2013), for instance,
propose an eigenvector-based technique to estimate both worker reliabilities and output qualities.
Simple analytic models (e.g., sum, average, minimum, or maximum) are employed to calculate
the rating scores of products. In weighted averaging techniques, evaluations cast by users are
weighted and their impact on final rating scores is adjusted based on their corresponding weights.
Davtyan et al. (2015) leverage on content similarity to increase the quality of aggregated votes
compared to standard majority voting approaches. Allahbakhsh et al. (2012) use time and credit
of crowdsourcing tasks to weight pairwise evaluations between the community members and
also propose the concept of fairness of an evaluator while evaluating other members. Iterative
approaches calculate weights of evaluations and the result of aggregation simultaneously but in
several iterations. Iterative methods for social rating have been pioneered in Laureti et al. (2006)
and Yu et al. (2006). Ignjatovic et al. (2008) have proposed a reputation calculation model for
online markets. Many more examples of aggregation algorithms exist (Hung et al. 2013b), with
Joglekar et al. (2013) also generating confidence intervals for aggregated values.
4.2.6 User Study. Assessing the effectiveness of task UIs for which there do not yet exist
reference guidelines may require conducting task-specific usability studies. Willett et al. (2012),
for instance, conducted user studies directly on Amazon Mechanical Turk without direct contact
between the experimenters and the workers. Khanna et al. (2010), instead, organized controlled
between-subjects study sessions with workers, implemented dedicated image annotation tasks,
and observed them in action to assess the usability of tasks to low-income workers from countries
like India. The key general barriers identified were the complexity of instructions and UIs, difficult
navigation, and different cultural backgrounds. Alagarai Sampath et al. (2014) used eye tracking
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to measure the working memory required by different task designs and their visual saliency. This
kind of user study requires expert skills, for example, for the conduct of interviews, the design of
questionnaires, or proper user observations.
4.3 Computation-based Assessments
4.3.1 Ground Truth. The use of ground truth data (gold data, control questions) is a common
approach in crowdsourcing: by injecting into tasks questions whose answers are known and
formalized a priori (so that they can be checked automatically), it is possible to computationally
estimate the aggregate accuracy of outputs and the trust in workers. Ground truth evaluation is
considered one of the most objective mechanisms that can accurately measure the performance of
workers (Huang and Fu 2013b). The method is, for instance, natively supported by CrowdFlower.
Eickhoff et al. (2012) provide an example of how to use ground truth data in gamification. Hara
et al. (2013) provide good examples of how to collect ground truth answers for image labeling
with wheelchair drivers (domain experts), while Oleson et al. (2011) argue that the generation
of ground truth data is very difficult and costly and propose the use of “programmatic gold”
generated from previously collected correct data. Liu et al. (2013) propose a method predicting an
optimal number of ground truth labels to include. Le et al. (2010) study the distribution logics of
gold questions and conclude that a uniform distribution produces best results in terms of worker
precision, while El Maarry et al. (2015) show that the biggest threat to ground truth evaluations
are tasks with highly skewed answer distributions. CAPTCHAs can be used to tell human workers
and machines (e.g., robots) apart (Lasecki et al. 2014; Von Ahn et al. 2008).
4.3.2 Outlier Analysis. Outliers are data points (e.g., worker performance or estimations of a
property) that significantly differ from the remaining data (Aggarwal 2013), up to the point where
they raise suspicion. Outliers may thus identify poorly performing workers, random answers, or
similar. In Rzeszotarski and Kittur (2012), the authors show how they use CrowdScape to link
behavioral worker information with output properties and identify outliers visually (in charts).
Jung and Lease (2011) use outlier analysis to identify “noisy workers” in consensus labeling tasks.
Marcus et al. (2012) use outlier analysis to detect “spammers” in estimation tasks.
4.3.3 Fingerprinting. This method captures behavioral traces from workers during task exe-
cution and uses them to predict quality, errors, and the likelihood of cheating. Behavioral traces
are identified by logging user interactions with the task UI (at the client side) and are expressed
as interaction patterns that can be used at runtime to monitor a worker’s conformance with
the patterns. The method has been coined by Rzeszotarski and Kittur (2011), demonstrating the
effectiveness of the approach in predicting output quality. Kazai and Zitouni (2016) even conclude
that “accuracy almost doubles in some tasks with the use of gold behavior data.” As an extension,
in Rzeszotarski and Kittur (2012) the authors propose CrowdScape, a system “that supports the
human evaluation of complex crowd work through interactive visualization and mixed initiative
machine learning.”
4.3.4 Achievements. Verifying the achievement of predefined goals is a typical method used to
assign so-called badges (certificates, proves of achievement) to users. The method resembles the
merit badge concept of the Scout movement, where one must attain all preceding badges before
qualifying for the next one (Puah et al. 2011). Achievements are used in crowdsourcing, especially
in the context of gamified crowdsourcing tasks, such as exemplarily shown inMassung et al. (2013),
where badges are used in a mobile data collection application to engage casual participants in pro-
environmental data collection. Badges were earned for activities such as using the application for
5 days in a row or for rating a shop on the weekend.
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4.3.5 Implicit Feedback. Implicit feedback is a method of content-based feedback analysis.
Feedback is implicit and extracted from the behavior of evaluators, rather than from explicit
feedback forms (De Alfaro et al. 2011). For example, in WikiTrust (Adler and De Alfaro 2007; Adler
et al. 2011), a reputation management tool designed for assessing Wikipedia users, the reputation
of the user is built based on the changes a user makes to the content. If a change is preserved by
editors, the user gains reputation, otherwise he loses reputation. Lin et al. (2014) analyze implicit
signals about task preferences (e.g., the types of tasks that have been available and displayed
and the number of tasks workers have selected and completed) to recommend tasks to workers.
Difallah et al. (2013) analyze workers’ personal interests expressed in social networking sites
(Facebook) to recommend tasks of likely interest in Mechanical Turk.
4.3.6 Association Analysis. Associations among people are, for instance, the friend-of relation-
ships in Facebook, the recommendations in Freelancer, or the following relationship in Github.
These relationships can be interpreted as expressions of trust or prestige and analyzed accord-
ingly. Already in 1977, Freeman (1977) proposed the idea of betweenness centrality as a measure of
a nodes importance inside a graph, with special attention toward communicative potential. In the
specific context of crowdsourcing, Rajasekharan et al. (2013) have, for example, extended the well-
known Page Rank algorithm (Page et al. 1999) with edgeweights to computewhat the authors call a
“community activity rank” for workers to eventually assess their reputation. This kind of network
analysis technique is typically more suited to contest crowdsourcing models, in which workers
may know each other, and less to marketplaces where there is no communication among workers.
4.3.7 Task Execution Log Analysis. Given a log (trace) of worker interactions and task comple-
tions, it is possible to analyze and/or mine the log for assessment purposes. Fingerprinting uses
log analysis to identify patterns; here the purpose is measuring quality attributes. Kucherbaev
et al. (2016a), for example, use linear regression to estimate task duration times at runtime
to identify likely abandoned tasks, that is, tasks that will not be completed by their workers.
Moshfeghi et al. (2016) use game theory to classify workers based on task execution durations.
Going beyond the estimation of individual quality attributes, Heymann and Garcia-Molina (2011)
propose Turkalytics, a full-fledged analytics platform for human computation able to provide
real-time insight into task properties like demographics of workers as well as location- and
interaction-specific properties. Huynh et al. (2013) reconstruct from logs a provenance network
that captures which worker saw/produced which data item in a set of inter-related tasks; the
network allows the authors to predict the trustworthiness of task outputs. Jung et al. (2014)
predict output quality by analyzing the time series of workers’ past performance; KhudaBukhsh
et al. (2014) do so to identify colluding workers.
4.3.8 Content Analysis. It is also possible to automatically analyze a task’s description and text
labels to assess properties like task difficulty or trust in the requester. Artz and Gil (2007), for
instance, speak about “common sense” rules tomake trust decisions, for example, do no trust prices
below 50% of the average price. Difallah et al. (2013) propose the use of different methods to assess
task difficulty: comparison of task description with worker skills, entity extraction and comparison
(based on Linked Open Data), or content-oriented machine-learning algorithms. Also (Yang et al.
2016) come to the conclusion that “appearance and the language used in task description can
accurately predict task complexity.” Alagarai Sampath et al. (2014), instead, analyzed the semantic
similarity of input field labels and showed that too diverse labels may act as distractors and that
these can be used to predict accuracy.
4.3.9 Transfer Learning. Transfer learning is the improvement of learning in a new task
through the transfer of knowledge from a related task that has already been learned (Torrey
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and Shavlik 2009). In crowdsourcing, transfer learning has been used to borrow knowledge from
auxiliary historical tasks to improve the data veracity in a target task, for instance, to infer the
gender or reliability of workers using a hierarchical Bayesian model (Mo et al. 2013). Fang et al.
(2014) use transfer learning to estimate labelers’ expertise in data labeling tasks inside Mechanical
Turk. Zhao et al. (2013), instead, apply transfer learning in a cross-platform setting to transfer
knowledge about workers from Yahoo! Answers to a Twitter-based crowdsourcing system.
4.3.10 Collusion Detection. Collusion detection aims to identify groups of colluding workers,
that is, workers that share information to gain an advantage. KhudaBukhsh et al. (2014) aim
to identify non-adversarial collusions in ratings by detecting strong inter-rater dependencies
across tasks, as these diverge from the mean ratings. Marcus et al. (2012) inject ground truth
data to detect colluders. Allahbakhsh et al. (2014), instead, compute a probability of collusion
by analyzing past collaborations of workers on same tasks and recommend likely non-colluding
workers for team formation.
5 QUALITY ASSURANCE
The logical step after assessing quality is assuring quality, that is, putting into place measures that
help achieve quality—the more so if the assessment unveiled low quality for any of the attributes
identified earlier. These measures, concretely, come in the form of strategies and actions that a
requester may implement. Some of these strategies and actions are reactive if they react to clearly
identified quality issues, for example, filtering outputs upon the verification that some outputs do
not meet given quality thresholds. Other strategies and actions are instead proactive in that they
do not need a triggering event to be applied, for example, following proper usability guidelines in
the implementation of a task does not require a prior verification of usability.
Before looking into the strategies and actions that have been used so far for quality assurance
in crowdsourcing, it is important to note that already assessing (measuring) quality, especially if
the object of the assessment is people, may have positive side effects on quality. Most notably,
reviewing has been shown to impact positively the performance of both workers and reviewers
(Zhu et al. 2014) and quality in general (Hansen et al. 2013). Rating has been used to increase the
requesters awareness of workers concerns and rights (Irani and Silberman 2013), but also rating
the performance of workers has similar positive side effects (Dow et al. 2012). Many other studies
that provide similar evidence exist.
In the following, we do not further study these side effects of assessment. Instead, we review the
strategies and actions that specifically aim to improve quality as a first-order goal. Many of them
require a prior quality assessment (e.g., filtering outputs requires first assigning quality labels to
them), others do not. We explain these aspects next, and organize the discussion as illustrated in
Figure 5. The identified strategies are as follows:
— Improve data quality: The first and most intuitive strategy to approach low quality in the
output data is improving the quality of the data itself, where possible. Typical actions range
from cleansing inputs (crowdsourcing is not immune to the garbage-in/garbage-out prob-
lem) to the iterative improvement of outputs.
—Select people: Another intuitive strategy is to identify workers that produce better results.
Doing so may require requesters to filter workers by their profiles, recommending tasks to
workers they think they will perform well or eliminating cheaters.
— Incentivize people: Incentivizing people means acting on the motivation that pushes people
to perform well (or not). There are two different sub-strategies that aim to leverage on two
different types of drivers (Rogstadius et al. 2011):
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Fig. 5. The quality assurance strategies (boxes with shadow) and actions (boxes without shadow) emerged
from literature.
—Extrinsic motivation depends on drivers that are determined from the outside of a person’s
own control. For example, workersmaywork harder if they see that it results into a higher
reward or even a bonus from the requester.
— Intrinsic motivation, instead, depends on drivers that are internal to the person and does
not depend on the desire for an external reward. For instance, workers may be pushed
to perform better if they can compare their performance with that of other workers or if
performing a task is entertaining (like in games).
—Train people: Workers can also be instructed or trained to be prepared better for specific
tasks or domains and, hence, to perform better. Different approaches can be followed, such
as teaching workers or providing feedback to the work they submit.
— Improve task design: One reason for low quality may be the low usability or understand-
ability of the user interface workers are provided with or the task description and structure
itself. Improving the design of a task may address related quality issues, for example,
starting from input fields left empty.
—Control execution: Finally, some actions can be enacted during runtime, that is, during the
execution of a task while workers are alreadyworking and submitting outputs. For example,
if it is evident at some point in time that not all workers will produce outputs, it could be
an idea to re-deploy some tasks.
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Each of these strategies can be implemented using different, concrete actions. We discuss these
in the following and summarize the discussion in Appendix A tabularly.
5.1 Improve DataQuality
5.1.1 Cleanse Data. The precondition of any process for good quality in output is good quality
in input. Khazankin et al. (2012) point out that a crowdsourcing platform cannot be responsible for
the output quality if the input data is inaccurate, and the requester is responsible for the accuracy
of the inputs. In fact, workers may be reluctant to work on a task if they perceive the quality of
the input (e.g., a blurred image) may impact their likelihood of getting the reward (Schulze et al.
2013). To overcome input quality problems, Bozzon et al. (2012), for instance, propose specific data
pre-processing steps to assemble, re-shape, or filter input data in CrowdSearcher. Bigham et al.
(2010) use computer vision techniques to improve the quality of pictures taken by blind people. Of
course, data cleansing can be applied also to output data.
5.1.2 Aggregate Outputs. In the book “The Wisdom of Crowds,” Surowiecki (2005) has shown
with his ox weight guessing experiment that averaging (aggregating) the guesses of multiple
people can produce an accurate overall guess. That is, adding redundancy (multiple workers
working on a same task) and aggregating outputs can increase the quality of outputs, of course,
at the cost of paying more workers. The responses of workers can also be weighted based on
their reliability to increase the influence of responses given by trusted and skilled workers (Aydin
et al. 2014). Particular attention is paid by literature to the aggregation of outputs in classification
tasks (Ho et al. 2016; Gao et al. 2016; Ok et al. 2016; Liu and Wang 2012), including Boolean ones
(De Alfaro et al. 2015; Ukkonen et al. 2015).
5.1.3 Filter Outputs. The assessment methods discussed in the previous section aim to tell
apart “good” from “bad” items (outputs, workers, requesters, etc.). The corresponding assurance
action that aims to improve quality is filtering out the bad items, so as to keep only the good
ones. Filtering is very prominent in crowdsourcing. For instance, Dow et al. (2012) filter outputs
based on self- and expert reviews, Hansen et al. (2013) filter outputs based on output agreements
(with/without arbitration) and peer review, Rao et al. (2013) use majority votes to filter outputs,
others use ground truth comparisons (Marcus et al. 2012), and so on. Jung and Lease (2012)
filter workers based on their past performance. As an extension of the pure filtering of outputs,
these may further be cleaned of possible biases by workers, for example, through active learning
(Zhuang and Young 2015; Wauthier and Jordan 2011).
5.1.4 Iterative Improvement. Instead of asking one worker to evaluate the work of another
worker (assessment), it is also possible to ask the former to directly improve the work of the
latter (assurance). Multiple iterations of improvement are of course possible. Little et al. (2010a),
for example, let workers iterate over writing tasks to incrementally improve a text written
collaboratively by the crowd, while in Little et al. (2010b) they apply iterative improvement to
decipher blurred text. In Turkomatic (Kulkarni et al. 2012a), workers can iteratively split tasks
down until they are manageable, thereby reducing the complexity of the overall task.
5.2 Select People
5.2.1 Filter Workers. Similar to outputs, a requester may also filter workers to make sure they
have the necessary skills, preparation, attitude, or similar for a task. This filtering can, for instance,
be based on the worker profiles and look at skills and expertise (Allahbakhsh et al. 2013; Zhao
et al. 2013), badges (CrowdFlower), or demographics (as a proxy for skills) (Kazai et al. 2012). Kazai
et al. (2012) filter workers also by personality, while Li et al. (2014) look at worker reliability, and
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Allahbakhsh et al. (2012) look at the reputation of workers inside the crowdsourcing platform. Hara
et al. (2013) use statistical filtering (outlier elimination) to discard low-quality workers. Abraham
et al. (2016), too, use reputation to filter workers, but also propose the use of adaptive stopping rules
to lower the cost of tasks. Nushi et al. (2015) specifically filter workers to increase crowd diversity.
5.2.2 Reject Workers. Instead of selecting good workers, it is also possible to skim out (reject)
non-fitting, fake, malicious, or colluding workers, often also called attackers or cheaters. Typical
adversarial techniques are randomly posting answers, artificially generating answers, or duplicat-
ing them from other sources (Difallah et al. 2012) as well as collaborations among workers aimed
at tricking the system (collusions). Bots or software agents can be eliminated using CAPTCHAs
(Lasecki et al. 2014). Difallah et al. (2012) use start time and end time to predict if a given result
comes from a cheater or not. It is important to properly tune the applied thresholds to detect
cheaters without affecting good workers (Bozzon et al. 2013). Marcus et al. (2012) compare ground
truth data with task outputs to prevent coordinated attacks from workers. Allahbakhsh et al.
(2014) identify collusions from past collaborations of workers.
5.2.3 Assign Workers. Instead of waiting for tasks to be pulled by random workers, it may be
more effective to proactively push tasks to cherry-picked workers. If both the skills required by a
task and those possessed by workers are defined, tasks can be automatically assigned. For example,
Mobileworks uses priority queues to assign tasks (Kulkarni et al. 2012b). Allahbakhsh et al. (2013)
assign stronger workers to harder tasks, while Roy et al. (2015) specifically focus on knowledge-
intensive tasks and show the benefits of maintaining a pre-computed index for efficient worker-to-
task assignment. Difallah et al. (2013) show that matches can also be derived from social network
activity, while Kulkarni et al. (2014) identify experts in social networks and recruit them. If no
skills regarding tasks and workers are given, a two-phase exploration-exploitation assignment
algorithm can be applied (Ho and Vaughan 2012). More dynamic approaches may even learn task
assignment policies at runtime, for example, to maximize the expected information gain (Kobren
et al. 2015).
5.2.4 Recommend Tasks. Instead of assigning tasks to workers, identified task-worker matches
can also be used to provide workers with recommendations of tasks they very likely are interested
in. This still allows workers to decide to work on a recommended task or not. A recommendation
can be delivered, for example, as an email notification when a new task is posted on a platform
(Bernstein et al. 2012), and subscriptions can be created using www.turkalert.com. Recommenda-
tions can be based on a worker’s task browsing history (Yuen et al. 2015), or they may take into
account implicit negative feedback (Lin et al. 2014).
5.2.5 Promote Tasks. With promoting a task we refer to all those actions that aim to enlarge
the worker basis for tasks, even outside crowdsourcing platforms. More workers means more
diversity, tasks completed, speed, and similar. Hu et al. (2012), for instance, place widgets with
integrated tasks on third-party services, such as the International Children’s Digital Library.
Kulkarni et al. (2012b) ask workers to recruit others for a given task, while others incentivize
this kind of recruitment (Nath et al. 2012). Also posting task information on worker community
sites, such as the “HITsWorthTurkingFor” reddit page, can increase the task’s workforce. A more
direct way of promoting tasks is to invite people, for example, experts from online communities,
to participate in tasks (Oosterman and Houben 2016).
5.2.6 Situated Crowdsourcing. This means bringing tasks to the workers physically, where it
is more likely to encounter target workers, instead of waiting for them to join a crowdsourcing
platform and to actively look for work. For instance, dedicated kiosks installed next to a library
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entrance (Hosio et al. 2014), vending machines installed in front of the major lecture hall in
a CS building (Heimerl et al. 2012), and public displays (Niforatos et al. 2016) have been used
for the crowdsourcing of small tasks. Similarly, Vaish et al. (2014) ask mobile phone users for
micro-contributions each time they unlock their phone, exploiting the common habit of turning
to the mobile phone in spare moments.
5.2.7 Recruit Teams. Team-based recruitment approaches overcome the problem of recruiting
enough workers by finding and recruiting teams of workers who have profiles matching the
task requirements. Forming and recruiting teams is possible in smaller communities such as
communities that are specialized in specific services like IT technical or business services
(Vukovic et al. 2010; Schall et al. 2012). Retelny et al. (2014) identify experts in the crowd and
organize them into teams to solve complex tasks. Li et al. (2014) run trial tasks to discover groups
of workers producing higher quality than average and target them for future work on the same
task. Rokicki et al. (2015) study different team competition designs to improve performance.
5.3 Improve Extrinsic Motivation
5.3.1 Tailor Rewards. One of the key properties of each task is the reward. Choosing the right
form and/or amount of the reward is thus of utmost importance for the success of a crowdsourced
task. Faradani et al. (2011) and Ho et al. (2015) show that it is important to tweak the amount
of the reward properly, so as to obtain good results. Radanovic and Faltings (2016) demonstrate
the effectiveness of dynamically adjusting payments based on output quality. Mao et al. (2013)
study the effectiveness of different rewarding schemas, such as volunteering, pay per time, pay
per task, pay per each data unit in a task, and show that workers are sensitive to the schemas.
Along the same line, Ikeda and Bernstein (2016) show that paying tasks in bulks may increase the
task completion rate, while coupons or material goods decrease participation. Scekic et al. (2013a)
also discuss deferred compensation and relative evaluation as well as team-based compensation
schemas. Sakurai et al. (2013) propose reward strategies based on worker performance. Singer and
Mittal (2013) study how to maximize the amount of tasks completed with a given budget using
different pricing strategies. Rokicki et al. (2014) study gambling-based rewarding strategies. Of
course, also non-monetary rewards, such as badges, can be seen as “virtual trophies” (Scekic et al.
2013a) that motivate workers, yet Kobren et al. (2015) also show that these kinds of objectives must
be designed carefully, otherwise they may produce detrimental effects.
5.3.2 Pay Bonus. A bonus is an additional, discretionary reward for good performance added to
the base reward of a task. Bonuses are typically granted for the achievement of predefined goals or
for reaching the threshold of key performance indicators (KPIs) (Scekic et al. 2013a). Difallah et al.
(2014) grant bonuses in response to workers meeting given milestones. Yin et al. (2014) top-up the
base reward for tasks if workers provide correct answers and if they react in less than 1 second. Yu
et al. (2014) give credits as base reward, bonuses of 5 cents for additional tasks performed and of
10 US dollars for earning most credits (assigned every other month). Faltings et al. (2014) show that
game-theoretic bonus schemas can also help eliminate worker bias, next to incentivizing them to
work better.
5.3.3 Promote Workers. Promoting a worker means raising the worker to a higher position
compared to his/her current one or compared to others. Promotions are particularly suitable to
those environments that are characterized by a long-lasting engagement of workers, for example,
crowdsourcing environment with deferred payment schemas. It has been shown that the prospect
of a promotion, for example, to get higher rewards or to obtain access to new types of tasks,
increases motivation, also over longer periods of time (Scekic et al. 2013a). For example, Dow et al.
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(2012) promote workers from content producers to feedback providers (assessors), while Scekic
et al. (2013b), next to promotions, also introduce the idea of punishments.
5.4 Improve Intrinsic Motivation
5.4.1 Share Purpose. Tasks that have a purpose that goes beyond the individual micro-task,
that workers understand and can identify with can help attract crowds to perform tasks with
higher motivation, also for free by volunteering (Dontcheva et al. 2014). Examples of crowdsourc-
ing initiatives driven by this sense of purpose are Zoouniverse (www.zooniverse.org) described
in Mao et al. (2013) or Wikipedia. As workers contribute for the purpose, rather than for the
monetary reward (if any), these tasks are typically less attractive to spammers or adversarial
workers. Kobayashi et al. (2015) show that tasks with an explicit social purpose may help
attract especially senior citizens as workers. Kaufman et al. (2016) identified that people tend to
contribute more to volunteering tasks with few other contributors involved.
5.4.2 Self-Monitoring. Enabling workers to compare their performance with that of other
workers (self-assessment) can switch workers into a competition mode that pushes them to
perform better (Ipeirotis and Gabrilovich 2014; Scekic et al. 2013a). Most crowdsourcing platforms
today already assign workers a reliability or performance rating visible in the platform. Ipeirotis
and Gabrilovich (2014) study the benefits of displaying scores to workers individually, overall
crowd performance, and leaderboards with complete or partial rankings of workers. Leaderboards
have been used extensively so far (Rokicki et al. 2014; Dontcheva et al. 2014; Preist et al. 2014).
5.4.3 Social Transparency. Social transparency means sharing identity (e.g., real name, persis-
tent identity in applications), content (e.g., comments), actions (e.g., tasks performed, endorse-
ments) amongworkers (Huang and Fu 2013a). Through transparency, workers build trust and bond
with their co-workers and the requester and define standards and quality control mechanisms that
eventually may improve performance and output quality (Huang and Fu 2013a; Viégas et al. 2007).
According to Yu et al. (2014), maintaining good relationships between workers helps also to at-
tract more workers. In collaborative crowdsourcing scenarios, social pressure amongworkers (e.g.,
asking to stay) can have positive impacts on performance (Feyisetan and Simperl 2016).
5.4.4 Gamify Task. Luis von Ahn introduced Games With A Purpose, where participants
perform tasks in games for joy and entertainment, rather than financial reward (Ahn 2006). Krause
and Kizilcec (2015) found that for complex tasks workers produce better results in a gamified than
in a paid condition; for simple tasks there was no difference. Designing tasks that induce curiosity
is a task-agnostic strategy to improve worker retention (Law et al. 2016). Feyisetan et al. (2015)
propose a model to predict optimal combinations of financial and gamified incentives.
5.5 Train People
5.5.1 Prime Workers. Priming uses implicit mechanisms to induce observable changes in
behavior that are usually outside of the conscious awareness of the primed person (Morris et al.
2012). Images, text, music, and videos can be used to induce positive emotions in workers that in
turn result in a positive effect on task performance, for example, an image of a laughing child may
induce workers to perform better (Morris et al. 2012). Alagarai Sampath et al. (2014) use priming
to help workers remember information. Faltings et al. (2014) study the effectiveness of priming
on task performance.
5.5.2 Teach Workers. Teaching means providing workers with suitable instructions in order
to enable them to perform tasks. Doroudi et al. (2016) show that providing expert examples
and letting workers validate others’ contributions are effective ways of teaching. Singla et al.
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(2014) use an algorithm to select expert examples to show to users. To many workers, gaining or
improving skills is a motivation per se. This motivation can be enforced by in-person training like
in Samasource (http://www.samasource.org/) or Mobileworks (https://www.mobileworks.com/)
or through interactive tutorials, such as the ones described by Dontcheva et al. (2014). Also,
designing tasks in a way that helps workers learn improves output quality (Yu et al. 2014).
5.5.3 Provide Feedback. Workers getting feedback from requesters about their performance
provide results of better quality (Dow et al. 2012). The process of reviewing others’ work itself
improves quality (Yu et al. 2014) and helps workers gain new skills (Zhu et al. 2014). Kulkarni et al.
(2012a) show how requester feedback is important to handle complex work in their Turkomatic
platform.
5.5.4 TeamWork. Teamworkmeans working together on a same task, where “together” means
by interacting with each other (we do not consider it a team work if several workers jointly label
a set of images without any inter-personal communication). Kittur (2010), for instance, use team
work for the translation of a poem, which requires negotiation between workers. André et al.
(2014) provide workers with a shared, collaborative editing space for creative writing tasks. Dorn
et al. (2012) propose flexible workflows to organize teams of collaborating workers.
5.6 Improve Task Design
5.6.1 Lower Complexity. One of the challenges in crowdsourcing is identifying the right
granularity, that is, complexity, for tasks. As Rogstadius et al. (2011) show, the accuracy of outputs
typically decreases with increasing task complexity. From a design perspective, it is further
important to implement tasks in a way that limits cognitive complexity; for instance, comparing
two objects is easier than identifying features of individual objects (Anderton et al. 2013). While
the simplification of more complex tasks introduces longer completion times, it leads to higher
quality; simpler tasks suit better if workers perform with interruptions (Cheng et al. 2015b).
5.6.2 Decompose Task. Another way to lower the complexity of a task is to decompose it into
sub-tasks. Kittur et al. (2011) propose a partition-map-reduce approach in CrowdForge, where
work is split into a set of sub-tasks executed in parallel and merged back later. Kulkarni et al.
(2012a) propose a price-divide-solve algorithm in Turkomatic, where workers themselves can
decide whether to work on a task themselves or rather split it into sub-tasks and then merge the
outputs produced by others.
5.6.3 Separate Duties. Separation of duties is a design pattern lent from the business practice
that requires multiple people to be involved in a decision, so as to prevent fraud or errors.
Organizing work in such a way that workers have only one single task to perform may further
lead to higher quality of outputs. Bernstein et al. (2010), for instance, propose a find-fix-verify
approach for text proofreading, where some workers identify errors in a text (find), some others
correct identified errors (fix), and others again check if there are no further mistakes left (verify).
In Kulkarni et al. (2012a), workers decide if they prefer to split a task or to perform it.
5.6.4 Validate Worker Inputs. Validating worker inputs means checking that the values pro-
vided by the workers through the form fields in the task UI comply with formal requirements, for
example, no empty fields or only correct email addresses. This is a common design guideline that
is, however, often not followed by requesters, eventually leading to low output quality. In Deluge
(Bragg et al. 2013) tasks are designed in such a way that workers must select at least one item
from a list of available options. On CrowdFlower and AskSheet (Quinn and Bederson 2014), the
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requester can select allowed formats (e.g., an email, US address, phone number, or even a custom
regular expression) for fields in the task form and identify mandatory and optional input fields.
5.6.5 Improve Usability. Just like for any kind of software, it is important that task UIs are
usable and properly follow common usability guidelines (Nielsen et al. 2002; Khanna et al. 2010).
Well-designed tasks lead to higher quality of the outputs (Kazai et al. 2011a). For instance, it is a
good practice to provide workers with clear and meaningful examples of good work (Willett et al.
2012). Highlighting input fields adequately and placing them closer to the relevant content reduces
search time and working memory load (Alagarai Sampath et al. 2014). Designing tasks in a way
that it takes the same or less time to perform a task properly rather than to cheat also helps avoid
spammers (Kittur et al. 2008).
5.6.6 Prompt for Rationale. Collecting rationales from workers for their own work is a good
way to encourage workers to be more conscious and to collect verifiable results, especially for
subjective tasks (McDonnell et al. 2016). Drapeau et al. (2016) suggest that allowing workers to
adjust their work based on rationales provided by other workers may improve quality further.
5.6.7 Introduce Breaks. Performing long sequences of monotonous tasks can be downing for
workers. Dai et al. (2015) show that introducing occasional breaks, such as playing games or read-
ing a comic, may help increase workers’ retention.
5.6.8 Embrace Error. There are classes of tasks where fast completion has higher priority than
the quality of each individual worker’s judgment. A way to approach such tasks is to design them
encouraging workers to perform very fast, accepting and even embracing possible errors, which
can be later rectified through suitable post-processing (Krishna et al. 2016).
5.7 Control Execution
5.7.1 Reserve Workers. Maintaining a pool of workers ready to work on a task is an effective
approach to minimize waiting time that is especially useful if results are to be collected fast,
for example, in real-time. For instance, it is possible to pay workers for the time they spend
waiting for tasks (Bernstein et al. 2012). To make sure workers stay focused during the waiting
time they can be asked to play a game (Lasecki et al. 2013). In case of requesters launching tasks
only occasionally, it can be financially efficient to maintain a single pool of workers for multiple
requesters. Bigham et al. (2010) adopt this approach and notify workers of the retainment pool
when a new task is published.
5.7.2 Flood Task List. Chilton et al. (2010) have shown that workers tend to give more attention
to newer tasks when looking for tasks to work for. If a task does not appear on the top of the first
page of the task list or even goes to the second page of the listing, the attention devoted to it
drops dramatically. To keep the attention of workers high, Bernstein et al. (2012) have shown that
repeatedly posting tasks (flooding) inside a crowdsourcing platform indeed increases the task’s
visibility and attractiveness.
5.7.3 Dynamically Instantiate Tasks. Monitoring the work of the crowd can allow the requester
to identify quality issues while a task is still in execution, for example, workers not completing
their work or doing so with too low level of quality. Kucherbaev et al. (2016a) show how dynamic
re-launching of tasks, that are automatically identified as abandoned, helps to lower overall task
execution times in exchange of a small cost overhead. Bozzon et al. (2013) support the dynamic
re-planning of task deployments. Yan et al. (2011) study how to actively learn to choose workers
to minimize speed and/or time. Many study how to maximize quality by dynamically instantiating
and assigning work under budget constraints (Li et al. 2016; Tran-Thanh et al. 2015; Chen et al.
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2013; Karger et al. 2011, 2014). Bansal et al. (2016) use content similarity to dynamically identify
data items to label and propagate labels to similar items.
5.7.4 Control Task Order. If a group of tasks presents interdependencies where the output of
one task affects the usefulness of another task, controlling the order of task deployment can help
avoid useless extra costs. For instance, in a set of comparison tasks if a = b and b  c , then there
is no reason to compare also a and c (Vesdapunt et al. 2014). Marcus et al. (2012) show how to
use selectivity estimations used in traditional databases for query optimization to order tasks and
reduce them in number. Lasecki et al. (2015) and Newell and Ruths (2016) suggest to group tasks
with related content into batches, because tasks that have already been completed by a worker
affect his/her focus in subsequent tasks, and the too high a diversity of task content inside a same
batch of tasks leads to interruptions due to context switch. Yet, Eickhoff and de Vries (2013) also
show that large batches tend to attract more cheaters than small batches. Difallah et al. (2016)
address context switch and minimize latency using scheduling techniques guaranteeing that all
tasks get equal attention.
5.7.5 Inter-Task Coordination. More complex tasks, especially composite tasks that involve
multiple different sub-tasks, can be managed by automating the respective crowdsourcing
workflow. Bozzon et al. (2013) propose an event-condition-action approach to organize tasks.
Kucherbaev et al. (2016b) overview workflow automation instruments tailored to crowdsourcing,
for example, Turkit (Little et al. 2010a) supporting scripting and CrowdLang (Minder and Bernstein
2012) supporting visual modeling.
6 ANALYSIS OF STATE-OF-THE-ART CROWDSOURCING PLATFORMS
In the following, we discuss and compare a selection of state-of-the-art crowdsourcing platforms
with the help of the taxonomy introduced in this article. We thus specifically look at the quality
model/attributes, the assessment methods, and the assurance actions supported by the approaches.
The crowdsourcing platforms we analyze represent a selection of heterogeneous instruments
drawn from both industrial systems and academic research prototypes. The selection is by no
means intended to be complete, nor does it represent a list of “most popular” instruments. It is
rather the result of an internal discussion among the authors of this article of the platforms we
found in our research, the platforms we looked at in the analysis, and the platforms we personally
worked with over the last years. The goal of the selection was to provide a varied picture of the
platforms that characterize today’s crowdsourcing landscape.
The result of this discussion is the selection of the following 14 platforms: Mechanical
Turk (http://www.mturk.com), one of the first crowdsourcing platforms for paid micro-tasks;
CrowdFlower (http://www.crowdflower.com), a meta-platform for micro-tasks that acts as proxy
toward other platforms; MobileWorks (http://www.mobileworks.com), a platform with an ethical
mission that pays workers hourly wages; Crowdcrafting (http://crowdcrafting.org), which targets
scientists and non-paid volunteers; Turkit (Little et al. 2010c), a JavaScript-based language for the
programmatic coordination and deployment of tasks on Mechanical Turk; Jabberwocky (Ahmad
et al. 2011), a MapReduce-based human computation framework with its own programming
language; CrowdWeaver (Kittur et al. 2012), a model-based tool with a proprietary notation and
crowdsourcing-specific constructs; AskSheet (Quinn and Bederson 2014), a Google Spreadsheet
extension with functions for the integration of crowdsourcing tasks; Turkomatic (Kulkarni
et al. 2012a), a crowdsourcing tool that delegates not only work to the crowd but also task
management operations (e.g., splitting tasks); CrowdForge (Kittur et al. 2011), a crowdsourcing
framework similar to Turkomatic that follows the Partition-Map-Reduce approach; Upwork
(https://www.upwork.com/), an auction-based platform for freelancers in different domains (e.g.,
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Table 1. Crowdsourcing Platforms Comparison by SupportedQuality Model/Attributes,
Assessment Methods, and Assurance Actions
Quality attributes Assessment Assurance
M
T
u
rk
data (accuracy), task incentives (extrinsic),
task terms and conditions (privacy), task
performance (cost efficiency, time efficiency),
worker profile (location), worker credentials
(skills), worker experience (badges,
reliability)
rating (reliability), qualification
tests (skills), ground truth questions
(accuracy), rating-based
achievements (badges)
filter workers by reliability (acceptance rate, tasks
completed), by badges (domain-specific master skill)
or location; assign workers; reject workers; tailor
rewards; pay bonus; provide feedback to workers;
validate worker inputs; prompt for rationale
C
ro
w
d
F
lo
w
e
r
data (accuracy, timeliness), task description
(clarity, complexity), task incentives
(extrinsic), task terms and conditions
(privacy, information security), task
performance (cost efficiency, time efficiency),
worker profile (location), worker credentials
(skills), worker experience (badges,
reliability)
rating (reliability), qualification
tests (skills), output agreement
(accuracy, reliability), feedback
aggregation (task satisfaction
survey on clarity, complexity,
incentives), ground truth questions
(accuracy), rating-based
achievements (badges), execution
log analysis (accuracy, timeliness)
aggregate outputs (consistency, accuracy), filter
workers (by country, by distribution channel, by
NDA), badges (obtainable level), skills (language),
reject workers, tailor rewards; pay bonus, provide
feedback, validate worker inputs, prompt for
rationale, control task order (select an order in which
tasks are deployed), inter-task coordination
(Crowdflower workflow plugin)
M
o
b
il
eW
o
rk
s
data (accuracy, timeliness), task incentives
(extrinsic), task terms and conditions
(privacy), worker profile (age, gender,
location), worker credentials (skills), worker
experiences (badges, reliability), group
(availability)
rating (reliability), qualification
tests (skills), expert review
(accuracy and reliability of group
members), peer review (accuracy),
ground truth (accuracy)
filter workers, reject workers, assign workers,
promote tasks (workers involve referrals), recruit
teams (recruit local small teams, interview via Skype),
tailor rewards, pay bonus, promote workers to team
leaders, teach workers, provide feedback, teamwork,
validate worker inputs, prompt for rationale, control
task order
C
ro
w
d
C
ra
ft
in
g intrinsic incentives (citizenscience), task
terms and conditions (privacy), task
performance (time efficiency), worker profile
(location, personal details)
execution log analysis (time
efficiency)
promote tasks (featuring on the platform), share
purpose (tasks from high impact scientific fields),
self-monitoring (contributions leaderboard), social
transparency (optional public worker profiles), prompt
for rationale, control task order (tasks order priority,
scheduling - depth first, breadth first, random)
T
u
rK
it
data (accuracy, timeliness), extrinsic
incentives (reward)
voting (accuracy) filter outputs, iterative improvement, tailor rewards,
separate duties (explicit voting tasks), dyn. instantiate
tasks (as a part of iterative improvement), control task
order (via automatic workflow), inter-task
coordination (programmatically using JavaScript-like
scripts)
Ja
b
b
e
rw
o
ck
y
data (accuracy), extrinsic incentives (reward),
worker profile (age, gender, location, custom
attributes), credentials (skills, certificates)
rating (accuracy), voting (accuracy) aggregate outputs, filter outputs, iterative
improvement, filter workers (rich profiles), assign
workers, tailor rewards, inter-task coordination (Dog
programs)
C
ro
w
d
W
e
a
v
e
r
data (accuracy, timeliness), extrinsic
incentives (reward), task performance (cost
efficiency, time efficiency)
voting (accuracy), output agreement
(accuracy), ground truth (accuracy)
cleanse data (divide, permute tasks), inter-task
coordination (supports runtime workflow edits)
A
sk
S
h
e
e
t
data (accuracy), extrinsic incentives (reward),
task performance (cost efficiency)
rating (accuracy), voting (accuracy) cleanse data (facilitated through spreadsheet
paradigm), aggregate outputs (spreadsheet formulas),
filter outputs (spreadsheet formulas, worker vote),
tailor rewards, validate worker inputs (enforce
predefined bounds and types), dyn. instantiate tasks
(launching extra instances until a certain threshold is
reached), control task order (prioritization), inter-task
coordination (using referral links in formulas)
T
u
rk
o
m
a
ti
c data (accuracy), extrinsic incentives (reward),
task description (complexity)
voting (accuracy) aggregate outputs (via “merging” tasks), filter outputs
(via “voting” tasks), tailor rewards, teamwork (via
runtime workflow edits), decompose task (via
“subdivision” tasks), inter-task coordination (emerges
at runtime following the price-divide-solve algorithm)
C
ro
w
d
F
o
rg
e data (accuracy), extrinsic incentives (reward),
task description (complexity)
voting (accuracy) aggregate outputs (via “reduce” step), filter outputs
(via “voting” tasks), decompose task (via dynamic
partitioning), inter-task coordination (according to
partition-map-reduce approach with possible nesting)
(Continued)
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Table 1. Continued
Quality attributes Assessment Assurance
U
p
w
o
rk
data (accuracy), extrinsic incentives
(reward), task terms and conditions (IP),
task performance (cost efficiency),
requester (reputation), worker profile
(location), worker credentials (skills,
certificates, portfolio), experiences
(badges, reliability)
rating (accuracy), qualification
test (skills), referrals (reliability),
expert review (accuracy),
achievements (badges), execution
log analysis (monitoring of
worked hours)
filter workers (also via interviews), reject workers
(disputes), assign workers (invite to work), recruit
teams, tailor rewards (per hour vs. fixed price),
pay bonus, social transparency, provide feedback,
teamwork, prompt for rationale
9
9
d
e
si
g
n
s
data (accuracy, timeliness), extrinsic
incentives (reward), task terms and
conditions (IP), worker profile (location),
worker credentials (skills), worker
experiences (badges, reliability)
rating (accuracy, reliability),
referrals (reliability),
achievements (badges)
filter outputs (based on competition), filter
workers (profile, experience), assign workers
(invite to work), tailor rewards (predefined plans
or direct negotiation), self-monitoring
(submissions of others are optionally visible),
social transparency (workers can use real
identities and build professional profiles), provide
feedback, teamwork, prompt for rationale
T
o
p
co
d
e
r
data (accuracy, timeliness), extrinsic
incentives (reward), task terms and
conditions (IP, information security),
worker profile (location), worker
credentials (skills), experiences (badges,
reliability, custom performance metrics)
rating (accuracy), peer review
(called community review),
achievements (badges), content
analysis (unit tests on submitted
code)
filter outputs (test-based or community review),
tailor rewards, pay bonus, self-monitoring
(leaderboard), social transparency (workers can
link social network profiles with their identities),
prompt for rationale
In
n
o
ce
n
ti
v
e data (accuracy), extrinsic incentives
(reward), task terms and conditions (IP,
compliance), worker profile (location,
rich profile), worker credentials (skills,
certificates)
rating (accuracy), expert review
(accuracy)
filter outputs (proposals filtered manually),
recommend tasks (based on workers skills and
interests), tailor rewards, prompt for rationale
software development or writing); 99designs (http://99designs.it/), a contest-based platform for
graphical design freelancers; Topcoder (https://www.topcoder.com/), a contest-based platform for
software developers and designers; Innocentive (http://www.innocentive.com/), a platform for the
crowdsourcing of innovation challenges.
We use the taxonomy to classify each of these platforms or tools individually in Table 1 and
to summarize the supported quality attributes, assessment methods, and assurance actions from
a qualitative point of view. Figures 6–8 provide a quantitative summary of the table in the form
of heat maps that color each of the leaves (quality attributes, assessment methods, and assur-
ance actions, respectively) of Figures 3–5 with a different intensity according to how many of the
platforms/tools support the respective feature; possible values thus range from 0 (white) to 14
(dark green). We discuss the findings in the following Sections.
6.1 Quality Model
Figure 6 illustrates how many of the studied platforms support each of the attributes of the quality
model derived in this article. Immediately, it is evident that the core concern almost all platforms
(13 out of 14) have is the accuracy of the outputs produced by the crowd. This is not surprising,
as high-quality outputs are one of the key drivers of crowdsourcing in the first place (next to cost
and time). In order to allow the requester to tweak quality, most platforms allow the requester
to fine-tune the extrinsic incentives (rewards) given for tasks (13/14), to select workers based on
age (2/14), gender (2/14), location (9/14), and skills (8/14). In addition, approximately half of the
platforms also implement proper reliability tracking (6/14) or reputation management systems
(6/14) for worker selection.
In order to understand these numbers better, it is necessary to disaggregate them. For instance,
it is important to note that worker profiles are typically kept simple by the marketplace platforms
(e.g., Mechanical Turk or CrowdFlower), while they are more sophisticated for auction-/contest-
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Fig. 6. Heat map of the quality model.
based platforms that target skilled freelancers (e.g., Topcoder or 99designs). In fact, the former (but
also the research prototypes that target the coordination of multiple tasks on top of existing mar-
ketplace platforms) mostly focus on simple microtasks for which the problem usually is finding
workers at all, not finding the best ones possible; in the latter platforms, instead, the profile has
an advertising purpose as well and therefore plays a more important role. All platforms generally
protect the privacy of their users; the research prototypes adopt the policies of the underlying
platform, while the platforms for freelancers may disclose personal information to enable transac-
tions among collaborating actors. Support for IP protection comes in the form of NDAs or transfer
agreements for freelancers. Worker assessment seems mostly based on skills, reliability, badges,
and/or reputation. That is, crowdsourcing tends to be meritocratic.
However, overall there is only little support for the different quality attributes identified in these
articles.Mostly, this is explained by the different focus of research (wide spectrumof attributes) and
commercial practice (narrow focus). For both areas, we identify the following points as possible
future research directions:
—Personality. The character and behavior of workers and requesters, acknowledged by
research as directly impacting the quality of outputs and the satisfaction of both, is
commonly neglected by state-of-the-art instruments. Yet, there seems to be an opportunity
for platforms that also aim to improve the attitude of people, for example, by facilitating
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the creation of shared values, social contacts, or social norms. People that feel well in their
workplace perform better and are more engaged in their work.
—Transparency. In general, while workers on many platforms are anonymous to requesters,
it is important to note that requesters are even more anonymous to workers. In order
to increase mutual trust, it is advisable that also requesters be assessed properly and
participate more actively in the actual work. How this assessment and/or collaboration
could happen is not straightforward in a domain where each new task may put into
communication completely new and unknown actors.
—Group work. While there are first attempts of organizing workers into groups and to facil-
itate the collaboration between workers and requesters, the quality and benefit of group
work is still not fully studied and understood. In this respect, we believe the attributes
considered so far are not sufficient to help characterize the quality of and leverage on the
full power of the crowd. But first of all, more support for group work and collaboration by
the platforms themselves is needed.
—User interface quality. Surprisingly, only very little attention is paid by the studied platforms
to the quality of the user interface of tasks deployed by requesters. Some platforms (e.g.,
CrowdFlower) provide crowdsourcing as a service to their customers, whereby they also
design and control the quality of the respective UIs. Yet, on the one hand, usability and learn-
ability are still concepts that have not percolated into concrete tools and, on the other hand,
they are still too generic as attributes to really help requesters to develop better interfaces.
6.2 Quality Assessment
Figure 7 illustrates the support of the discussed assessment methods. As in the case of the quality
model, also here we see that only about half of the methods identified previously are also imple-
mented by current crowdsourcing platforms. Rating (9 out of 14) and voting (6/14) are the most
prominent assessment methods, the former mostly used by requesters to assess work/workers,
the latter mostly used by workers for the peer assessment of work/workers. It is further evident
that the current support of assessment methods is mostly limited to technically simple methods,
while more complex capabilities are crowdsourced themselves. For instance, the group assessment
methods are well developed overall, while the computation-based methods are still limited.
Again, it is good to disaggregate the numbers. While rating is almost the only feedback mech-
anism in the marketplace platforms, and it is essential for the proper functioning of the platforms
based on contests, it is interesting to note that almost none of the research prototypes makes
use of rating. Instead, given their focus on the coordination of tasks, these platforms heavily
leverage on voting for quality assessment, an activity that naturally involves multiple workers
and possibly the requester and external experts. In line with the limited user profiles featured by
typical marketplace platforms, they instead prominently propose the use of qualification tests to
select workers. On the contrary, the auction- and contest-based platforms bet on achievements as
an automated technique to assess performance (e.g., badges).
For the future, we identify the following challenges in terms of quality assessment:
—Self-assessment. This assessment method is underestimated by current practice, despite
its proven benefit to learning and to the quality of produced outputs. How to make
self-assessment an integral and integrated part of crowdsourcing in general is, however,
non-trivial and still open.
—User interface assessment. In line with our comment on the quality attributes regarding
UI quality, also in terms of assessment methods there is huge room for improvement.
Significant effort still needs to be invested into the development of proper guidelines for
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Fig. 7. Assessment heat map.
the design of intuitive and robust task UIs, as well as into automated methods of their
assessment, for example, as attempted by Miniukovich and De Angeli (2015).
—Runtime analytics. Assessment methods are mostly applied after task execution, while
they could easily be applied also during task execution to enable preemptive interventions
aimed at increasing quality while a task is being worked on. Suitable analytics features and
interventions could not only improve the accuracy of outputs, but also their timeliness and
cost efficiency.
6.3 Quality Assurance
Finally, Figure 8 illustrates the state of the art in quality assurance. It is surprising to see that the
spectrum of assurance actions introduced earlier in this article is explored almost completely by
current crowdsourcing platforms. Of course, the tailoring of the reward (11 out of 14) dominates,
but also filter outputs (8/14) and filter workers (6/14) are adopted relatively widely. Prompting for
rationals is supportedwhere requesters can design task input forms or interact withworkers (8/14).
Only situated crowdsourcing, prime workers, improve usability (out of the control of platforms),
reserve workers, and flood task list are not supported by any of the platforms.
The disaggregation of the data reveals that the strong support of inter-task coordination (7/14)
and task order control (5/14) mostly stems from the research prototypes that specifically focus on
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Fig. 8. Heat map of assurance model.
this aspect. To the best of our knowledge, only CrowdFlower internally uses a workflow engine for
task automation, and only Innocentive seems to make use of task recommendations. Interestingly,
it appears that the research community with its prototypes for task automation mostly concen-
trates on assuring quality by promoting actions with effects that are limited to a given context
only, for example, controlling the order of tasks or splitting tasks into smaller chunks. Commercial
platforms rather look at more comprehensive actions, such as intrinsic motivators (e.g., social
transparency) or team building, which have effects that cross tasks and are longer lasting in nature.
We identify the following points as crucial aspects to approach next:
—Task recommendation.With the increase of the popularity of crowdsourcing, both the num-
ber of workers and that of tasks published on crowdsourcing platforms is destined to grow.
It is thus increasingly hard for workers to find tasks they are interested in, capable of, and
good at. This asks crowdsourcing platforms to help match workers and work, which means
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recommending tasks to workers with the right skills. Research is very active in this area,
but support for custom worker profiles and recommendation algorithms is still missing.
—Long-term relationships. To make crowdsourcing sustainable in the longer term, it may be
necessary that requesters and workers establish tighter relationships, for example, to train
workers with skills that will serve them in the future and assure them predefined levels of
income. Continuous and task-specific training must turn into common practice and be seen
as an investment by both workers and requesters.
—Workflow integration. Finally, with the increasing complexity of work that is crowdsourced,
the need for coordination and automation will increase too. So far, the problem has been
studied only in the form of isolated research prototypes. The challenge now is conceiving
principles, techniques, and tools that enable the seamless integration of crowd workflows
into existing IT and business practices.
7 CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
By now, crowdsourcing is a well established practice and a concrete option to solve problems that
neither individuals nor computers may be able to solve on their own (nor together), while they
can be solved by asking help from contributors that are not known but that can bring in their
human intelligence. With this survey, we comprehensively studied one of the key challenges
of crowdsourcing, that is, quality control. We analyzed literature on crowdsourcing published
in major journals and conferences from 2009 onward and synthesized a quality model that
represents all the attributes that have been studied so far to understand quality in crowdsourcing.
We accompanied the model with a comprehensive discussion of the methods and actions that
have been used to assess quality and to enforce quality, respectively. From the survey it is evident
that, although quality control is perceived as crucial by all actors involved in crowdsourcing and
significant effort has already been invested into it, we are still far from a practice without quality
issues that effectively delivers human intelligence to its customers.
We consider the following two areas for future work as particularly critical to guarantee quality
and sustainability in the longer term:
—Domain-specific services. Most crowdsourcing platforms, especially micro-task platforms
and research prototypes, still position themselves as technology providers managing the
crowd and tasks from an abstract point of view. Crowdsourcing a piece of work thus
requires requesters to possess intimate crowdsourcing expertise (e.g., to control quality)
and to “program” the crowd on their own. To make crowdsourcing more accessible,
domain-specific service providers that know the domain requirements, tasks, and concerns
and that can effectively assist also less skilled requesters in all phases of the crowdsourcing
process are needed. CrowdFlower, for example, already positions itself as a Data Science
platform; platforms for creative tasks like 99designs or Topcoder are domain-specific by
design. Research on quality control has produced significant contributions so far, but it too
needs to focus on domain-specific aspects if it wants to excel. Guaranteeing the quality of
labels for images is just so different from doing so, for example, for text translations.
—Crowd work regulation and ethics. Crowdsourcing is a worldwide phenomenon and practice
that allows workers and requesters from all over the world to establish business relation-
ships. Yet, common rules and regulations for crowd work, for example, regarding taxation,
pension, superannuation, resolution of disputes and similar, are still missing. Each crowd-
sourcing provider provides its own rules and legal protections so far, if at all. Similarly, the
ecosystem as a whole (including workers, requesters, and platform providers alike) needs to
grow shared work ethics and standards. MobileWorks, for instance, guarantees its workers
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. 51, No. 1, Article 7. Publication date: January 2018.
Quality Control in Crowdsourcing: A Survey 7:33
hourly wages, but this can only represent a starting point for sustainable crowd work. On
the IT research side, controlling the compliance of rules, regulations, and ethical aspects
may ask for novel monitoring and assessment techniques, for example, in the context of
collusion detection.
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